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Abstract—Semiconductor design houses are increasingly becoming
dependent on third party vendors to procure intellectual property (IP)
and meet time-to-market constraints. However, these third party IPs
cannot be trusted as hardware Trojans can be maliciously inserted
into them by untrusted vendors. While different approaches have been
proposed to detect Trojans in third party IPs, their limitations have
not been extensively studied. In this paper, we analyze the limitations
of the state-of-the-art Trojan detection techniques and demonstrate
with experimental results how to defeat these detection mechanisms.
We then propose a Trojan detection framework based on information
flow security (IFS) verification. Our framework detects violation of IFS
policies caused by Trojans without the need of white-box knowledge of
the IP. We experimentally validate the efficacy of our proposed technique
by accurately identifying Trojans in the trust-hub benchmarks. We also
demonstrate that our technique does not share the limitations of the
previously proposed Trojan detection techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s system-on-chips (SoCs) usually contain tens of IP cores
(digital and analog) performing various functions. To lower research
and development (R&D) cost and speed up the development cycle,
the SoC design houses typically purchase most of the IP cores from
third-party (3P) vendors [1]. This raises a major concern toward the
trustworthiness of 3PIPs because 3PIP vendors can insert malicious
components (known as hardware Trojans) in their IPs [2]. This
issue has gained significant attention as Trojans inserted by a 3PIP
vendor can create backdoors in the design through which sensitive
information can be leaked and other possible attacks (e.g., denial of
service, reduction in reliability) can be performed [3].
Detection of Trojans in 3PIPs is challenging as there is no golden
version against which to compare a given IP core during verification.
In theory, an effective way to detect a Trojan in an IP core is to
activate the Trojan and observe its effects, but a Trojan’s type, size,
and location are unknown, and its activation condition is most likely a
rare event. A Trojan can be, therefore, well hidden during the normal
functional operation of the 3PIP supplied as register transfer level
(RTL) code. A large industrial-scale IP core can include thousands
of lines of code. Identifying the few lines of RTL code in an IP core
that represents a Trojan is an extremely challenging task [4].
Different approaches have been proposed to validate that an IP does
not perform any malicious function, i.e., an IP does not contain any
Trojan. Existing Trojan detection techniques can be broadly classified
into structural and functional analysis, logic testing, formal verifi-
cation, information flow tracking and runtime validation. Structural
analysis employs quantitative metrics to mark signals or gates with
low activation probability as suspicious signals that may be a part of
a Trojan [6] [7]. Hicks et al. [8] have proposed a technique named
unused circuit identification (UCI) to find the lines of RTL code that
have not been executed during simulation. These unused lines of
codes can be considered to be part of a malicious circuit. However,
these techniques do not guarantee Trojan detection and Sturton et
al. [9] have demonstrated that hardware Trojans can be designed to
defeat UCI technique.
Functional analysis based approaches [10] [11] rely on functional
simulation to find suspicious regions of an IP which have similar
characteristics of a hardware Trojan. Waksman et al. [10] have
proposed a technique named Functional Analysis for Nearly-unused
Circuit Identification (FANCI) which flags nets having weak input-
to-output dependency as suspicious. Zhang et al. [11] have proposed
a technique called VeriTrust to identify nets that are not driven by
functional inputs as potential trigger inputs of a hardware Trojan.
However, in [12] authors have shown that a Trojan can be designed to
bypass both of these detection techniques. Farahmandi et al. [13] have
proposed a Trojan detection technique based on symbolic algebra.
However, this technique requires a golden reference of the IP which
may not be available when it is procured from 3P vendors.
Some recent works have utilized formal methods and information
flow tracking (IFT) based techniques to detect Trojans. Rajendran
et al. [14] have proposed a technique to formally verify malicious
modification of critical data in 3PIP by hardware Trojans. Another
similar approach has been proposed in [15] which formally verifies
unauthorized information leakage in 3PIPs. In [16] [17], authors
have proposed the concept of proof-carrying code (PCC) to formally
validate the security related properties of an IP. Commercial tools,
e.g., Jasper security path verification tool [18] can identify informa-
tion leakage caused by design bugs and/or hardware Trojans. Wei
et al. [19] have used information flow tracking to detect Trojans in
3PIP cores. These state-of-the-art techniques have been shown to be
effective in detecting various types of Trojans. However, all of these
techniques share some inherent limitations which can be exploited to
bypass their detection capabilities.
In this paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of IFT/formal
Trojan detection techniques. Also, we propose a novel framework to
detect Trojans in 3PIPs addressing the shortcomings of previously
proposed techniques. Our proposed framework is based on informa-
tion flow security (IFS) verification which detects violation of IFS
policies due to Trojans. Once we detect the presence of a Trojan, we
extract its triggering condition. In this paper, we focus on utilizing
our framework for Trojan detection. However, it can also be used to
detect IFS violations unintentionally introduced by design mistakes or
by CAD tools [22] [23]. We summarize our contribution as follows:
• We analyze the limitations of the recent Trojan detection tech-
niques for 3PIP ([14] [15] [18] [16]) and demonstrate how these
limitations can be exploited to bypass their detection capabilities.
• We propose a IFS verification framework which detects viola-
tions of confidentiality and integrity policies caused by Trojan.
The novelty of this approach is that it models an asset (e.g., a net
carrying a secret key) as a fault and leverages the automatic test
pattern generation (ATPG) algorithm to detect the propagation
of the asset.
• We propose a partial-scan ATPG technique to identify
the observe/control points through/from which an asset can
be leaked/influenced. Traditional full-scan ATPG and full-
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Figure 1: System-on-chip (SoC) design flow
sequential ATPG cannot be used for this purpose.
• We propose a technique to differentiate between a valid asset
propagation path and a Trojan payload path.
• Our proposed technique can detect Trojan inserted by 3P ven-
dors, e.g., design for test (DfT) vendors. This differentiates our
approach from previously proposed techniques which cannot
work with DfT inserted netlist.
• We experimentally validate the efficacy of our proposed tech-
nique using 18 benchmarks from the trust-hub [21].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we give the necessary background on SoC design flow and discuss
our threat model. In Section III, we analyze the limitations of the
previously proposed Trojan detection technique and demonstrate with
experimental results how to exploit them. Section IV discusses our
proposed framework which consists of confidentiality verification,
integrity verification, and trigger condition extraction. We present
our results in Section V. We discuss the limitations of our proposed
approach in Section VI. We conclude the paper with Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
A. SoC Design Flow
Figure 1 shows a typical SoC design flow. Design specification by
the SoC integrator is the first step. The SoC integrator then identifies
a list of IPs necessary to implement the given specification. These IP
cores are either developed in-house or purchased from 3PIP vendors.
If purchased, these 3PIP cores can be procured in the following three
forms [24],
• Soft IP cores are delivered as synthesizable register transfer level
(RTL) written in hardware description language (HDL) such as
Verilog or VHDL.
• Firm IP cores are delivered as gate level implementation of the
IP, possibly using a generic library.
• Hard IP cores are delivered as GDSII representations of a fully
placed and routed design.
After developing/procuring all the necessary soft IPs, the SoC
design house integrates them to generate RTL specification of the
whole SoC. The RTL design goes through extensive functional testing
to verify the functional correctness of the SoC and also to find any
design bugs. SoC integrator then synthesizes the RTL description
into a gate-level netlist based on a target technology library. They
may also integrate firm IP cores from a vendor into this netlist.
The SoC integrator then integrates DfT structures to improve the
design’s testability. However, in many cases, the DfT insertion is
outsourced to third party vendors who specialize in designing test
and debug structures, e.g., built-in self-test (BIST), compression
structures. In the next step, the gate-level netlist is translated into
a physical layout design. It is also possible to import IP cores from
vendors in GDSII layout file format and integrate them at this stage.
After performing static timing analysis (STA) and power closure, SoC
integrator generates the final layout in GDSII format and sends it out
to a foundry for fabrication [2].
Note that, we consider the entities inside the green box in Figure
1 as trusted while the entities inside the red box as rogue/untrusted.
B. Threat Model
In this section, we present how the potential adversaries can
implant a hardware Trojan in a SoC design. We also briefly describe
their objectives and their capabilities. Finally, we present the types
of hardware Trojans covered by our threat model.
1) Potential Adversaries: We consider that all the 3PIPs, i.e., soft,
firm and hard IPs as untrusted. However, in this work, we mainly
focus on the soft and the firm IPs. The third party vendors involved
in the SoC design flow (e.g., design for test (DfT) insertion) are
considered untrusted as well. We consider the SoC integrator and the
CAD tools as trusted entities. Although we do not trust the foundry,
Trojan inserted by the foundry is out of the scope of this paper.
Trojans inserted by foundry can only be detected by post-silicon
verification techniques, whereas in this paper we focus on Trojan
detection in pre-silicon design stage.
We assume that the third party vendors will insert the Trojans
while the SoC integrator will try to detect them. We consider the SoC
integrator has black box knowledge of the IP purchased from the third
party vendors. That is, the SoC integrator only has the knowledge of
the high-level functionality of the IP. The 3PIP vendors have full
control over their IP and can insert stealthy Trojans which would
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to detect using traditional
test and verification techniques. The other important players in SoC
design flow are the third party vendors, e.g., DfT vendors who have
access to the whole SoC design and have the capability to incorporate
stealthy malicious circuitry in the SoC.
The objective of the adversaries is to implant Trojan in the SoC
design through which sensitive information can be leaked and other
possible attacks (e.g., denial of service, reduction in reliability) can
be performed.
2) Hardware Trojan Structure: The basic structure of a hardware
Trojan in a 3PIP can include two main parts, trigger, and payload.
A Trojan trigger is an optional part that monitors various signals
and/or a series of events in the SoC. Once the trigger detects an
expected event or condition, the payload is activated to perform a
malicious behavior. Typically, the trigger is expected to be activated
under extremely rare conditions, so the payload remains inactive most
of the time. When the payload is inactive, the SoC acts like a Trojan-
free circuit, making it difficult to detect the Trojan [2].
A Trojan can have a variety of possible payloads. In this paper,
we focus on payloads which leak secret information (violation of
confidentiality) and/or allows an adversary to gain unauthorized
access to a privilege system (violation of integrity). Note that, most
Trojan payloads will either violate the confidentiality and/or the
integrity policies of the SoC.
In this paper, we classify Trojan into two broad categories,
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Figure 2: C17 benchmark circuit
• Trojan type I: This type of Trojan delivers its payload through
the valid asset propagation path. For example, RSA-T100 trust-
hub Trojan [21] leaks the private key through valid ciphertext
output port. This type of Trojans generally creates a bypass path
and allows an adversary to extract the asset.
• Trojan type II: This type of Trojan delivers its payload through
a malicious circuit which is not authorized to observe or control
the asset. For example, AES-T100 trust-hub Trojan [21] leaks
the private key through a leakage circuit which is functionally
isolated from the valid encryption logic.
The structure and the functionality of RSA-T100 and AES-T100
Trojans are discussed in details in Section V.
III. PREVIOUS WORKS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
Limitations of existing Trojan detection approaches, e.g., UCI [8],
FANCI [10], VeriTrust [11] have been discussed in details in [9], [12],
[14]. In this paper, we analyze recent Trojan detection techniques
which utilize formal methods and/or information flow tracking.
A. Formal Verification
Rajendran et al. [14] proposed a technique to formally verify
malicious modification of critical data in 3PIP by hardware Trojans.
Another similar approach has been proposed in [15] which formally
verifies unauthorized information leakage in 3PIPs. Both techniques
are based on bounded model checking (BMC) where the BMC checks
for the property-“does critical information get corrupted?” and “does
the design leak any sensitive information?”. The underlying concept
is same for both techniques, and therefore, we will focus our analysis
on [15].
To check for information leakage caused by Trojan, authors in [15]
used the following property,
P |= (s0 == o)∨ (¬s0 == o), ∀ s0 ∈ 0,1 (1)
where, s0 is the individual bit of sensitive information (e.g., en-
cryption key) and ¬s0 is the inverted logical value of s0. o is any
leakage point (e.g., output port). The authors claim that this property
can detect if the sensitive information or a function of the sensitive
information is leaked.
However, there exist many limitations of this technique, as dis-
cussed below:
False Positive Results: The fundamental limitation of this technique
is that it will produce a large number of false positive results. The
reason is that the property only checks if the logical value of s0 or
its inverted value ¬s0 is same as the logical value of o. However, the
property does not guarantee if there exists an information flow from
s0 to o causing the possibility of false positive results. We illustrate
this limitation using the simple C17 benchmark circuit.
Figure 2 shows the schematic of the C17 benchmark circuit. It
is clear from Figure 2 input N1 is not in the fan-in cone of the
output N23. In other words, there is no information flow from N1 to
N23. Now we write the following assertion to prove the property of
Equation 1.
P |= assert never ((N1 == N23)∨ (¬N1 == N23)) (2)
We use the inclusive formal verification (IFV) tool of Cadence
[25] to verify this property. The IFV tool returns that the assertion
has failed which means that there exists information leakage from N1
to N23. This is a false positive result as there exists no information
flow from N1 to N23. The reason for this false positive result is that
the IFV tool uses other input pins to make the logical value of N23
equal to N1. This result illustrates that the technique proposed in
[14], [15] would produce a large number of false positive results for
any practical circuit.
Limited Verification Capability: Another fundamental limitation of
any model checking technique is that a sequential circuit can be
unrolled or verified only to a limited number of clock cycles, T . If the
Trojan is designed in such a way so that its trigger gets activated after
T , then the Trojan would evade detection. In [14], [15] the authors
acknowledged this limitation and proposed a trivial solution that the
design needs to be reset once the number of clock cycles exceeds T .
This proposed solution, however, does not provide adequate pro-
tection from Trojans. To demonstrate this, we take the AES-T1100
Trojan benchmark circuit [21] from trust-hub. The triggering circuit
of this Trojan can be illustrated as a finite state machine (FSM)
consisting of four states (shown in black color in Figure 3). This
Trojan is triggered when it observes four specific plaintexts (P1, P2,
P3, P4) in the correct order. We use the property of Equation 1 and
use the IFV tool to detect the Trojan. The IFV tool easily detects the
Trojan and also shows the triggering condition. Next, we modify the
Trojan triggering circuit by incorporating one more state (State 4 in
Figure 3) and a 20 bit counter. Once the Trojan observes the four
specific triggering sequence, it starts the counter and waits for 220
cycles before triggering its payload (State 5 in Figure 3). We now use
the IFV tool again to detect the Trojan and the tool now fails to detect
it. We also designed the Trojan counter and FSM trigger in such a
way that these registers are not reset-able. Therefore, even when the
design is reset, these registers store their current state and deliver
its payload when the triggering condition is met. Our modification
only introduces 0.4% area overhead compared to the original AES-
T1100 Trojan. Also, non-reset-able FFs are not uncommon, e.g.,
DFFX1 is a non-reset-able FF in the Synopsys standard cell library.
Therefore, our proposed modification does not make the Trojan circuit
distinguishable from the rest of the circuit. This experiment illustrates
another crucial weakness of the formal methods in detecting Trojan.
B. GLIFT-based Trojan Detection
GLIFT-based Trojan detection technique [19] relies on gate-level
information flow tracking (GLIFT) [20] to detect Trojan. To account
for hardware specific information flow, GLIFT technique tracks
information flow through Boolean gates. At gate level, all information
flow appears at the most basic level of abstraction which allows
Figure 3: Finite state machine of the modified triggering circuit of
AES-T1100 Trojan
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Figure 4: AES encryption module with a hardware Trojan. The Trojan
leaks the secret key through the ciphertext output when it is triggered.
detecting information flow that is inherently not visible at higher
levels (software level). In GLIFT each data bit is associated with
a taint bit and the propagation of data is monitored by tracking
the tainted bits as they flow through Boolean gates. To track the
propagation of taint bits, each standard cell gate is augmented with
its corresponding tracking logic gate (referred to as GLIFT logic).
However, GLIFT logic generation is a difficult problem due to its
inherent complexity. Also GLIFT logic can produce false positive
results as shown in [20].
To detect Trojan using GLIFT, Wei et al. [19] label the secret key
as HIGH (tainted) and all the remaining inputs as LOW (untainted).
Then they write formal properties to check if an unauthorized output
port can have HIGH taint. In an encryption module any output port
apart from the ciphertext outputs is considered as unauthorized output
point as the secret key should not propagate to this point. The main
advantage of GLIFT over formal verification based techniques, i.e.,
[14], [15] is that formal methods only check functional properties,
e.g., a signal X can take a logic value of Y [19]. This does not reveal
the actual information flow, raising the possibility of false positive
results as shown in Section III-A. On the contrary, GLIFT can track
the actual information flow.
However, this technique also has some inherent limitations which
can be exploited to bypass this technique.
Indistinguishable Valid and Malicious Paths: GLIFT-based Trojan
detection technique assumes that “it is normal for the key to flow to
the ciphertext output in a cryptographic function” [19]. However, the
proposed technique fails to take into account that an adversary can
design a Trojan which leaks the key through ciphertext output. Figure
4 shows such a Trojan whose payload leak keys through a ciphertext
output when a certain trigger condition is applied. The GLIFT-based
Trojan detection technique would not be able to distinguish between
the valid key propagation path and the key leakage path caused by the
Trojan. This limitation raises the possibility of false negative results.
Taint Explosion: Another major limitation of the GLIFT-based
technique is that it cannot be applied to detect Trojans inserted by
rogue DfT vendors. As discussed in Section II-B, in many cases the
DfT insertion is often outsourced to third party vendors who have
access to the whole SoC design and have the capability to incorporate
a Trojan. In a DfT inserted design all the FFs in a scan chain will be
connected in series in scan mode. Now, if a secret information (taint
value HIGH) is propagated to any of these FFs, then in scan mode
all the FFs in the scan chain will be tainted as HIGH as well, causing
a taint explosion. Therefore, GLIFT technique cannot be applied to
detect Trojan in DfT inserted netlist. One may argue that it is possible
to apply GLIFT in only functional mode by applying constraint in
the scan enable signal. However, it has been demonstrated that it
is possible to design Trojan that delivers its payload in scan mode,
e.g., s35932-T100 Trojan in trust-hub [21]. Such Trojans cannot be
detected using GLIFT-based Trojan detection technique.
Also, GLIFT technique relies on formal tools to detect Trojan
and therefore, shares the same limitation of Limited Verification
Capability of formal methods.
C. Jasper Security Path Verification
With the growing importance of data security assurance, commer-
cial tool vendors have started introducing security verification tools.
JasperGold Security Path Verification (SPV) tool of Cadence [18] is a
powerful formal verification tool that accepts a RTL code containing
a specific secure area (memory or key location), and exhaustively
proves that secure information: (i) cannot be read illegally, (ii) cannot
be illegally overwritten
Jasper tool formally checks whether there exists any functional
path from source signal A to destination signal B. The tool first
injects a unique tag called “taint” on A and utilizes a proprietary
path sensitization technology to verify whether this unique tag can
ever appear at B. Among many applications, Jasper tool can detect
Trojans which cause information leakage.
However, Jasper tool may not be effective in detecting certain types
of Trojan. Jasper SPV tool checks whether there exists any functional
path from asset to a destination signal. A SoC integrator having
black-box knowledge of a 3PIP may not know which internal signal
to check for that is associated with a Trojan. For example, AES-
2000 or AES-T2100 [21] Trojans direct the key to internal registers
and rely on dynamic power consumption of these registers to leak
the key. Such Trojans may not be detected using Jasper as a SoC
integrator may not know which specific signals to look for to detect
these Trojans.
We applied the Jasper security path verification on AES-T2000
and AES-T2100 Trojan benchmark circuits [21] and analyzed for
information leakage of a key bit to all output ports. However, we
were unable to detect these Trojans as we do not know which specific
internal signal to analyze for information leakage.
D. Trojan Detection by Signal Sensitivity Tracing
Jin et al. [16] have proposed the concept of proof-carrying code
(PCC) to formally validate the security related properties of an IP
and detect the possible Trojan presence. PCC methodology was
proposed to perform data sensitivity tracing. The data sensitivity list
contains the overall information of the distribution of the sensitive
information across a design and this list can be evaluated to detect
possible Trojan payload which leaks the sensitive information. The
sensitivity of circuit signals which does not contain sensitive data
are allocated with 0 value while the signals containing sensitive data
are allocated with positive integer values. A larger value indicates
a higher level of the sensitivity of the signal and therefore, requires
a higher level of protection. The signal transition value needs to be
updated as the signal goes through different circuit operations. Their
Figure 5: Stable sensitivity status of AES encryption module. The red
dotted line represents the Trojan leakage path and the blue colored
mask is part of the Trojan payload.
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Figure 6: Overview of our proposed IFS verification framework for
Trojan detection.
proposed technique uses a conservative model which allows only a
few operations to downgrade the signal sensitivity list.
Figure 5 shows the stable signal sensitivity status of an AES
encryption module. As shown in Figure 5, the sensitivity value of
ciphertext output is { f ix : 0}. The authors assume that a Trojan
circuit which leaks sensitive information will cause sensitivity value
of ciphertext output to be a positive integer instead of { f ix : 0}.
Bypassing Sensitivity Checking: It is possible to design a Trojan
which leaks the sensitive information without making the sensitivity
value of ciphertext output a positive integer. An attacker can introduce
a Trojan leakage path which bypasses the S-Box, ShiftRow and
MixColumn operation, and leaks the intermediate state to the output
(shown with a red dotted line in Figure 5). Note that, this Trojan path
does not affect the sensitivity value of ciphertext output. However,
this Trojan leaks the intermediate state (Plaintext⊕Key) when it is
triggered allowing the attacker to recover the key from the known
plaintext. This Trojan bypasses the proposed detection technique
as it does not affect the sensitivity value of ciphertext output. We
experimentally validate this limitation using the AES-T100 Trojan
benchmark [21] in Section V-D.
IV. TROJAN DETECTION THROUGH IFS VERIFICATION
In Section III, we have shown that recent Trojan detection tech-
niques suffer from large false positive results and limited verification
capability. Also, these techniques cannot distinguish between a valid
and a Trojan propagation path and is also incapable of detecting
Trojans in DfT inserted netlist. We propose a novel framework to
detect Trojan in 3PIPs which addresses these limitations.
Our proposed Trojan detection framework is based on information
flow security (IFS) verification which detects violation of IFS policies
due to Trojans. This framework can be applied to synthesized gate-
level netlist of a design. To detect Trojan using IFS framework, a
SoC integrator will first synthesize the 3PIP to get the gate-level
netlist and then apply the framework. Another advantage of IFS
verification technique is that it can also detect Trojan in a DfT inserted
netlist unlike previously proposed techniques (see Section III-B).
Therefore, the proposed technique can be applied to detect Trojan
inserted by DfT vendors. Our Trojan detection framework is based
on the observation that a Trojan, however, small, will alter the normal
information flow of a design and thereby violate information flow
security (IFS) policies. The challenge here is to detect IFS violation
caused by Trojan without using any golden reference model.
Our IFS verification framework is based on a novel concept of
modeling an asset (e.g., a net carrying a secret key) as a stuck-at-0 and
stuck-at-1 fault and leveraging the automatic test pattern generation
(ATPG) algorithm to detect that faults. A successful detection of
faults means that the logical value of the asset carrying net can be
observed through the observe points or logical value of the asset
can be controlled by the control points. In other words, there exists
information flow from asset to observe points or from control points
to asset. Here, the observe points refer to any primary or pseudo-
primary (scan FFs) outputs that can be used to observe internal signals
and the control points refer to the primary or pseudo-primary (scan
FFs) inputs that can be used to control internal circuit signals.
For our IFS verification framework, we need to identify all observe
points through which an asset can be observed and identify all
control points from which an asset can be controlled. There are
certain challenges of using conventional full-scan and full-sequential
ATPG analysis for IFS verification framework. In full-scan ATPG,
we can detect the asset propagation only to the first level FFs. Asset
propagation to the subsequent level of FFs cannot be performed
using full-scan ATPG [27]. This presents a major limitation because
the observe points associated with a Trojan which is not located in
the first level FFs, will not be detected by full-scan ATPG. In full-
sequential ATPG method, a sequence of functional input stimulus
is generated to activate and propagate a fault to an observe point.
However, even for a simple stuck-at fault, the full-sequential ATPG
needs to search through the space of all possible test vector sequences.
Due to the high complexity of the full-sequential ATPG, it remains
a challenging task to detect fault propagation in sequential circuits
that do not incorporate any DfT scheme [26].
We overcame the limitations of full-scan and full-sequential ATPG
with our proposed partial-scan ATPG technique which is capable of
identifying the observe/control points of an asset. In a partial-scan
design, the scan chains contain some, but not all, of the sequential
cells in the design. Traditionally, partial-scan is used to minimize
area overhead (caused by DfT structure) while attaining targeted test
coverage. However, in our IFS framework, we have used the partial-
scan ATPG to identify the observe points through which an asset can
be observed and identify the control points from which an asset can
be controlled. Note that, the partial-scan ATPG technique is only used
for our IFS verification purpose. Once the verification is performed,
the design can be transformed into a full-scan design to improve test
coverage.
Figure 6 shows the overview of the IFS verification framework
for Trojan detection. This technique can detect Trojan inserted
by 3PIP and DfT vendors. The IFS verification can be further
classified to Confidentiality Verification and Integrity Verification.
In Confidentiality Verification, we analyze all the observe points
through which an asset can be observed and identify if the asset
can be observed through any unauthorized/malicious observe points.
Similarly, in Integrity Verification, we identify if an asset can be con-
Figure 7: Confidentiality verification algorithm utilizes partial-scan
ATPG to identify the observe points through which an asset can
be observed. The algorithm utilizes add scan ability, masking and
successive fan-out analysis. Here, O(1) and O(2) represent the first
and second stage observe points, respectively.
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Algorithm 1 Confidentiality Verification
1: procedure CONFIDENTIALITY VERIFICATION
2: Input: Asset, gate-level netlist, technology library
3: Output: Observe points, asset propagation path, stimulus vector
4: FF level← 1
5: add scan ability(all register)
6: for all a ∈ Asset do
7: FanoutFinal← f anout(a,end points only)
8: mask register(FanoutFinal)
9: while 1 do
10: for all FO ∈ FanoutFinal do
11: unmask register(FO)
12: add Faults(a,“stuck−at”)
13: run sequential AT PG
14: analyze Faults(a,“stuck−at 0”)
15: analyze Faults(a,“stuck−at 1”)
16: if detected f aults > 1 then
17: append ObsPoints← FO
18: Report : propagationpath(a,FO),controlsequence
19: append FanoutTemp← f anout(FO,end points only)
20: remove scan ability(FO)
21: mask register(FO)
22: end if
23: end for
24: if FanoutTemp is not empty then
25: FanoutFinal← FanoutTemp
26: FF level ++
27: else
28: break
29: end if
30: end while
31: end for
32: end procedure
trolled by any unauthorized/malicious control points. We distinguish
between authorized and unauthorized observe/control points using our
proposed Malicious Observe/Control Point Identification technique.
This technique allows us to detect Trojans without the need of white
box knowledge of the IP and golden reference model. Once we have
identified any IFS verification failure, we apply the Trigger Condition
Extraction technique to extract the triggering condition of the Trojan.
It is important to note that IFS framework utilizes existing test tools
such as Tetramax from Synopsis, Fastscan from Mentor Graphics, or
Encounter Test from Cadence which is commercially available and
widely used by industry and academia. In this paper, we have used
Tetramax [29] along with our developed tcl code to implement the
IFS verification framework.
In the subsequent subsections, we describe the various steps of our
proposed IFS verification framework in details.
A. Confidentiality Verification
Confidentiality policy ensures that the information from a classified
system never leaks to an unclassified one. For example, a secret key
for data encryption should never flow to an unclassified domain. A
violation of the confidentiality policy indicates that an asset can be
leaked through an observe point which is accessible to an attacker.
In Confidentiality Verification, we first identify all the observe points
through which an asset can be observed and analyze if the asset can
be observed through any unauthorized observe points.
Our proposed confidentiality verification technique is presented in
Algorithm 1 and shown in Figure 7. The algorithm, first takes an asset
(name of the port or net where the asset is located), the gate-level
netlist of the design and the technology library (required for ATPG
analysis) as inputs (Line 2). Then, the algorithm adds scan capability
to all the FFs in the design to make them controllable and observable
(see line 5). Here, we use the “What If” analysis capabilities provided
by the Tetramax software which allows one to add and/or remove
FFs from scan chain. This feature allows us to perform partial-scan
analysis dynamically without requiring to re-synthesize the netlist.
Now, for each asset a ∈ Asset, the algorithm finds the observe points
(primary output or scan FFs) in the fan-out cone of a (Line 7). The
algorithm then adds capture masks in these FFs (Line 8) so asset
propagation to any observe point can be individually tracked. Next,
for each observe points FO, the algorithm removes the mask from
(Line 11) so that propagation of a to FO can be detected. Line 12
of Algorithm 1 adds asset a as the only stuck-at fault in the design.
Lines 13-15 use ATPG algorithm in the sequential mode to find paths
to propagate a = 0 and a = 1 to observe point FO. If both, a = 0 and
a = 1 is detected from FO (Line 16), then there exists an information
flow from a to FO and the algorithm marks FO as an observe point
and reports the propagation path from a to FO as well as the control
sequence or stimulus required for the asset propagation (Line 17-18).
Next, the algorithm finds the next level observe points by analyzing
the fan-out cone of FO (Line 19). Also, the scan ability is removed
from FO and thereby allowing the asset to propagate to next level
observe points through FO using sequential ATPG (Line 20). This
process continues until a level of observe point is reached where
all the observe points are primary outputs or the sequential ATPG
algorithm cannot generate patterns to propagate the fault to observe
point (Line 24-28). The output of the algorithm is the list of observe
points, and the propagation path along with the stimulus vector for
asset propagation for each observe points.
Malicious Observe Point Identification: Algorithm 1 identifies the
observe points through which an asset can be observed. However,
in order to detect the presence of a Trojan, we need to distinguish
between valid/authorized and malicious observe points.
In Section II-B2 we have broadly classified Trojans into two types.
The Trojan Type I leaks the asset through valid observe points
by creating bypass paths for asset leakage. This type of Trojan
can be detected by analyzing the asset propagation path reported
by Algorithm 1. The propagation path report contains propagation
depth which represents the total number of gates an asset propagates
through before reaching the observe points. The propagation depth
for the Trojan bypass path will be much less than the propagation
depth of valid propagation path. Here, one can argue that an attacker
can add redundant logic to make the propagation depth of leakage
path equal to the valid path. However, our technique is applied to
the synthesized netlist and the synthesis process will automatically
remove any redundant logic. Also, by analyzing the propagation
path, we can retrieve which type of operations (e.g., and, or, xor)
an asset goes through before propagating to an observe point. A SoC
designer having the high-level knowledge of the 3PIP can also use
this information to identify Type I Trojans.
Figure 8: Overview of our proposed intersect analysis. The blue
region represents the all observe point where an Asset can propa-
gate to and the green region represents all the fan-in elements of
valid observe points (Ciphertext output port). The red dotted region
represents the malicious observe points (Type II Trojan).
Paper 6.1 INTERNATIONAL TEST CONFERENCE 6
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for Integrity Verification
1: procedure INTEGRITY VERIFICATION
2: Input: Asset, gate-level netlist, technology library
3: Output: Control points, asset activation path, stimulus vector
4: FF level← 1
5: add scan ability(all register)
6: for all a ∈ Asset do
7: FaninFinal← f anin(a,start points only)
8: while 1 do
9: add Faults(a,“stuck−at”)
10: run sequential AT PG
11: analyze Faults(a,“stuck−at 0”)
12: analyze Faults(a,“stuck−at 1”)
13: if detected f aults > 1 then
14: for all FI ∈ FaninFinal do
15: append ControlPoints← FI
16: Report : ControlPath(a),control sequence
17: append FaninTemp← f anin(FI,start points only)
18: remove scan ability(FI)
19: end for
20: end if
21: if FaninTemp is not empty then
22: FaninFinal← FaninTemp
23: FF level ++
24: else
25: break
26: end if
27: end while
28: end for
29: end procedure
Now, Trojan Type II leaks the asset through a leakage circuit
which is functionally separated from the logic which is authorized to
handle the asset. We distinguish the observe points associated with the
leakage circuit by our proposed Intersect Analysis. In this analysis,
we record all the fan-in elements of the valid observe points. For
example, in an encryption module ciphertext output ports are the
valid observe points. If we find any FF which can observe the asset
but is not located in the fan-in cone of the ciphertext output ports
then we can conclude that the key can be leaked to an observe point
which is not part of the encryption logic. In other words, there exists
a violation of confidentiality policy in the given design. Figure 8
shows the Intersect Analysis.
B. Integrity Verification
Integrity policy ensures that an untrusted system should never
influence a trusted one. For example, an untrusted control point (e.g.,
a register), should never be able to influence a control pin of a trusted
system. A violation of the integrity policy indicates that an asset can
be influenced by control points which are accessible to an attacker.
In Integrity Verification, we first identify the control points through
which an asset can be controlled and analyze if the asset can be
influenced by any unauthorized control points.
Our proposed integrity verification technique is presented in Al-
gorithm 2 and shown in Figure 9. The algorithm, first takes an
asset (name of the register where the asset is located), the gate-
level netlist of the design and the technology library (required for
ATPG analysis) as inputs (Line 2). Then, the algorithm adds scan
capability to all the FFs in the design to make them controllable and
observable (see line 5). Now, for each asset a ∈ Asset, the algorithm
finds the control points (FaninFinal) in the fan-in cone of a (Line 7).
Line 9 of Algorithm 2 adds asset a as the only stuck-at fault in the
design. Lines 9-12 use ATPG algorithms in the sequential mode to
activate the fault. A successful detection of the faults indicates that
there exists information flow FaninFinal to a (Line 13). Now for
each FI ∈ FaninFinal, Algorithm 2 marks the FI list as a control
point and reports the activation path from FI to a as well as the
control sequence or stimulus required to activate the faults (Line 15-
16). Next, the algorithm finds the previous level control points by
analyzing the fan-in cone of FI (Line 17). Also, the scan ability is
removed from FI and thereby allowing the asset to be controlled by
previous level control points (Line 18). This process continues until
a level is reached where all the control points are primary inputs or
the sequential ATPG algorithm cannot generate patterns to activate
the faults from the control points (Line 21-25). The output of the
algorithm is the list of control points and the activation path along
with the stimulus vector for asset activation.
Malicious Control Point Identification: Algorithm 2 identifies all
the control points which can influence an asset. We use similar
techniques discussed in Section IV-A to distinguish between valid/
authorized and malicious control points.
We detect the Trojan Type I by analyzing the depth of asset
activation path. The depth for the Trojan path will be much less
than the depth of valid asset activation path. We detect the Trojan
Type II using our proposed Intersect Analysis. Here, we record all
the fan-out elements of the valid control points. For example, if we
consider the program counter (PC) of a microprocessor as an asset
then the valid control point for PC will be the pipeline register in
the instruction decode stage. If we find any FF which can control the
asset but is not located in the fan-out of PC then we can conclude
that there exists a violation of integrity policy.
C. Trigger Condition Extraction
Our proposed Confidentiality and Integrity Verification coupled
with Malicious Observe/Control Point Identification identify IFS
violation introduced by a Trojan. Now, we need to find the input
sequence which triggers the Trojan.
Confidentiality Verification reports the stimulus vector which
causes an asset to propagate to a malicious observe point whereas
Integrity Verification reports the stimulus vector which creates an
activation path from a malicious control point to the asset. For some
Trojans, the triggering sequence can be directly extracted from the
stimulus vector. For example, in RSA-T100 [21] monitors a particular
plaintext to trigger its Trojan and AES-T900 [21] triggers after a
certain clock cycle. These triggering conditions are relatively simple
and can be directly extracted from stimulus vector. However, there are
Trojans e.g., AES-T1100 [21] whose trigger circuit is composed of a
finite state machine (FSM) and triggers when a sequence of plaintext
is observed. The stimulus vector generated by IFS framework will
Figure 9: Integrity verification algorithm utilizes partial-scan ATPG
to identify all control points from which an asset can be influenced.
The algorithm utilizes add scan ability, masking and successive fan-
in analysis.
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Table I: Results for Confidentiality Verification.
Benchmarks Trojan payload Trojan trigger Trojan type # of Observe points # of Malicious points time(s)
AES-T100 Leaks the key through covert CDMA channel Always on II 42 16 251.5
AES-T200 Leaks the key through covert CDMA channel Always on II 42 16 273.8
AES-T700 Leaks the key through covert CDMA channel Specific plaintext II 42 16 277.1
AES-T900 Leaks the key through covert CDMA channel Counter II 42 16 293.7
AES-T1100 Leaks the key through covert CDMA channel Plaintext sequence (FSM) II 42 16 362.9
AES-T2000 Leaks the key through PSC of shift register Specific plaintext II 35 1 240.5
AES-T2100 Leaks the key through PSC of shift register Plaintext sequence (FSM) II 35 1 350.5
RSA-T100 Leaks the key through ciphertext output Specific plaintext I 37 2 19.7
RSA-T300 Leaks the key through ciphertext output Counter I 37 2 20.4
DES-T100 Leaks the key through covert CDMA channel Always on II 28 16 79.7
PRESENT-T100 Leaks the key through covert CDMA channel Always on II 19 16 1.53
AES-T1100 (M) Leaks the key through covert CDMA channel Plaintext sequence (FSM) II 42 16 364.5
report the register values (Trig Conditon) of Trojan trigger circuit
which violates IFS policies. However, it will not report the functional
input sequences which will cause the Trig Conditon.
To extract the triggering condition for Trojans like AES-
T1100, first, we need to determine if the registers associated with
Trig Conditon is part of an FSM. If the output of a register feeds
back to its input through a series of combinational circuits, then it is
a potential state register [30]. The reason is that the next state of any
FSM depends on the present state and therefore, any state register
will have a feedback loop. Once we have identified the state registers,
we use the FSM extraction technique proposed in [31] to retrieve
the functionality of the FSM. This technique determines the present
states and input conditions which cause a transition to a particular
state and repeat this process to extract the state transition graph (STG)
of the overall FSM. For our case, we apply this technique to extract
the present states and input conditions which cause a transition to a
state represented by Trig Conditon. Then we repeat the process to
generate the STG of the overall FSM. From the STG, we can extract
the sequence of input patterns which triggers the Trojan.
One major advantage of this technique is that it reverse engineers
the STG of the FSM and does not rely on functional simulation or
unrolling of a sequential circuit. In Section III-A we have shown that
formal method is only effective to a limited number of clock cycles
and an attacker can easily exceed this limit by introducing additional
states and counter. However, the FSM extraction technique is not
limited by the number of clock cycles and is capable of detecting
these types of Trojan, unlike the formal methods.
V. RESULTS
A. Experimental Setup
We applied our IFS verification framework to detect Trojans in
trust-hub [21] benchmark circuits. We used the Trojan benchmarks
which cause IFS violation. As mentioned in Section IV, our proposed
technique works with synthesized gate-level netlist. However, most
trust-hub [21] benchmark circuits are in RTL level. Therefore, we
first synthesized the RTL benchmarks into gate-level netlist and
then, apply our technique. All benchmarks were synthesized using
Synopsys Design Compiler [28] with Synopsys standard cell library.
Note that, our technique works at gate level netlist, and therefore, is
independent of the technology node.
We used Tetramax [29] (Synopsys) along with our custom tcl
scripts to perform the Confidentiality and Integrity verification.
We implemented the state machine extraction technique [31] using
Matlab (for text parsing and analysis) and Tetramax (for pattern
generation).
B. Confidentiality Verification
We applied our Confidentiality Verification algorithm to detect
twelve different Trojan benchmark circuits which violate the confi-
dentiality policy. Table I summarizes our results. Column 1 represents
which Trojan benchmark was used for our verification while column
2 and 3 represent the Trojan payload and Trojan trigger for each
benchmark. Column 4 shows the Trojan types which was discussed
in Section II-B2. In the Trojan benchmark circuits, all key bits are
considered as assets. The analysis was performed for a single bit of
the asset key for each implementation such as, for AES-T100, key[0]
was used. Note that, we also experimented with other asset bits (e.g.,
key[1], key[2], etc.) and they produced identical results for the key
bits which are leaked.
We first apply the Confidentiality Verification to identify the
observe points that can observe the asset. Column 5 shows the number
of observe points for each asset bit. We then apply our Malicious
Observe Point Identification to identify the observe points associated
with Trojans. Column 6 shows the malicious observe points identified
by the proposed approach. Column 7 shows the required time in
second for each analysis.
For all the twelve Trojan benchmark circuits, our algorithm was
able to detect the confidentiality violation caused by the Trojan
circuit. For example, in AES-T100 the Trojan leaks the private
key through a covert channel using Code-Division Multiple Access
(CDMA) communication. The Trojan employs a pseudo-random
number generator (PRNG) to create a CDMA code sequence and
XOR it with secret key bits. The modulated sequence is forwarded
to a leakage circuit (LC) which leaks the sequence using the single
output port. Our Intersect Analysis detects the registers in the leakage
circuit and also detects the malicious output ports through which the
key is leaked. This Trojan is Type II Trojan meaning that the Trojan
payload circuit is not part of the encryption algorithm. This Trojan
is an always on Trojan and therefore, it does not have any triggering
circuit.
AES-T200, AES-T700, AES-T900, AES-T1100 Trojan bench-
marks use the same Trojan payload as AES-T100 to leak the secret
key. All these Trojans are detected by our technique in the same way
as the AES-T100 Trojan. Note that, the number of observe points and
the malicious observe points are same for all these benchmarks. The
reason is that these benchmark circuits use the same underlying AES
algorithm and have the same Trojan payload. The difference among
these Trojans is how they are activated. AES-T700 is activated when
it observes a specific triggering sequence whereas AES-T900 gets
activated after a specific number of encryptions is performed. We
detect these triggering conditions by analyzing the stimulus vector
reported by our Confidentiality Verification algorithm. The stimulus
vector shows the condition for which an IFS violation occurs and
these conditions represent the triggering sequence of the Trojan.
AES-T1100 Trojan’s trigger circuit is composed of a finite state
machine (FSM) and it triggers when a sequence of plaintexts is
observed. The stimulus vector generated by our proposed framework
will report the logic value of the Trojan state FFs for which the
IFS violation occurs. However, it does not report the sequence of
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Table II: Results for Integrity Verification.
Benchmarks Trojan payload Trojan trigger Trojan type # of Control points # of Malicious points time(s)
PIC-T100 Manipulates program execution flow Counter II 17 13 0.358
PIC-T200 Manipulates instruction register Counter II 41 14 100.5
b19-T500 Manipulates instruction register FSM II 193 2 211.6
RS232-T500 Manipulates a control signal Counter II 13 2 0.381
s35932-T100 Manipulates scan mode Counter II 23 23 1.905
RSA-T400 Replaces the key to leak plaintext Counter II 34 33 20.2
plaintexts for which the Trojan triggers. We apply the state machine
extraction technique proposed in [31] to retrieve the sequence of
plaintexts which triggers the Trojan. This technique successfully
extracts the triggering condition. Apart from AES-T1100, triggering
circuit of AES-T2100 and AES-T1100(M) Trojan benchmarks also
consists of an FSM. The trigger conditions of these Trojans were also
successfully detected by [31]. Note that, we identify the presence of
FSM in the triggering circuit by identifying the state FF as discussed
in Section IV-C.
AES-T1100(M) is the modified Trojan that we have presented in
Section III-A. We modified the AES-T1100 Trojan triggering circuit
by incorporating one more state (State 4 in Figure 3) and a 20
bit counter. Once the Trojan observes the four specific triggering
sequence, it starts the counter and waits for 220 cycles before
triggering its payload (State 5 in Figure 3). This Trojan was also
detected by our technique. Also, note that the time difference to
detect AES-T1100 and AES-T1100(M) is very small, meaning that
no matter how many additional states or cycles were introduced by
the attacker, these Trojans will always be detected by our approach.
AES-T2000 and AES-T2100 Trojan benchmark have a different
payload. The payload circuit of these Trojans consists of a shift
register and it leaks the secret key through power side channel (PSC).
These Trojans are also Type II Trojan and were detected by our
intersect analysis. RSA-T100 and RSA-T300, on the other hand, are
type I Trojans as they leak the key through valid ciphertext output.
These Trojans were also detected by our technique as the propagation
depth of these Trojan’s leakage path is much less than the propagation
depth of the valid paths.
To prove that our proposed framework can be applied to other
designs, we implemented the payload circuit of the AES-T100 Trojan
in DES and PRESENT encryption modules [32]. We detected the
Trojans in DES and PRESENT encryption modules as well.
C. Integrity Verification
We applied our Integrity Verification algorithm to detect six differ-
ent trust-hub Trojan benchmark circuits which violate the integrity
policy and were able to detect all of them. Table II summarizes our
results. Column 1 represents which Trojan benchmark was used for
our verification while column 2 and 3 represent the Trojan payload
and Trojan Trigger for each benchmark. Column 4 shows the Trojan
types which was discussed in Section II-B2. Column 5 shows the
number of control points for each asset bit while column 6 shows
the malicious control points identified by the proposed approach. The
selection of asset for Integrity Verification is not as straightforward as
the Confidentiality Verification. For Integrity Verification, we need to
analyze the design and determine which asset an adversary may want
to manipulate. For example, in a micro-processor an adversary may
want to manipulate the program counter, instruction register, control
and status registers (CSR). Therefore, all these registers need to be
analyzed for integrity violation.
PIC-T100 Trojan manipulates the address of program memory, so
that valid execution flow of the program is affected. Here, we make
one bit of the program address register as the asset and apply our
Integrity Verification. The algorithm returns all the control points that
can influence the asset. We know that the asset (program address
register) should only be controlled by the program counter (PC)
and based on this assumption we apply our Malicious Control Point
Identification technique. Our analysis returns that the asset can be
influenced by a counter register which is not the PC. This proves the
violation of integrity policy and presence of a malicious circuit. When
we analyze the stimulus vector reported by out Integrity Verification,
we can find that the asset is influenced when the malicious counter
reaches the value of 100.
PIC-T200 and b19-T500 manipulate the instruction register of
their corresponding micro-processor. Here, the asset is one bit of the
instruction register. The instruction register should be controlled by
the instruction cache. Our Integrity Verification along with Malicious
Control Point Identification shows that the asset can be controlled
by other malicious registers. The trigger condition for PIC-T200 was
extracted by analyzing the stimulus vector. The trigger circuit of b19-
T500 contains an FSM, and we determined the trigger condition by
the FSM extraction technique proposed in [31].
s35932-T100 Trojan enables the scan enable signal of a part of
one scan chain in the functional mode which allows an adversary to
leak internal signal value. To detect this Trojan, we first identify the
scan FFs which are not directly driven by scan enable signal. We then
apply the Integrity Verification to see which control points influence
the scan enable port of these FFs. Our analysis shows when a certain
counter value is reached, some internal registers take control of the
scan enable port. This indicates a violation of integrity property as
scan enable port of a scan FF should only be influenced by the scan
enable signal. Our technique also successfully detected RS232-T500
Trojan which manipulates a control signal.
The RSA-T400 benchmark contains a Trojan that replaces the key,
which allows only the attacker to decrypt the ciphertext. To detect this
Trojan, we first apply Confidentiality Verification algorithm to find
which registers the key can propagate to. Next, we apply our Integrity
Verification in these registers. These key registers should only be
influenced by the key and plaintext input. We applied our Malicious
Control Point Identification technique and found that certain internal
registers can manipulate the key registers. We also extracted the
trigger condition by analyzing the stimulus vector.
D. Comparison
In Section III, we have presented the limitations of the state of the
art Trojan detection techniques. Here, we will experimentally validate
that our proposed technique does not share these limitations.
Formal Methods: Trojan detection based on formal methods, i.e.,
[14], [15] are effective only to a limited number of clock cycles.
We exploited this limitation to design AES-T1100(M) Trojan and
experimentally verified that this Trojan cannot be detected by [14],
[15].
However, our proposed framework was able to detect this Trojan
as shown in Table I. The reason is that our technique is not limited
the number of clock cycles and therefore, no matter how many cycles
are introduced by the attacker, this class of Trojans will always be
detected by our approach.
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Also, our technique tracks the actual asset propagation path and
therefore, does not create False Positive Results like [14] [15].
GLIFT: GLIFT-based Trojan detection [19] cannot distinguish be-
tween the valid key propagation path and the key leakage path caused
by the Trojan. Therefore, Type I Trojans like RSA-T100 and RSA-
T300 cannot be effectively detected by [19]. However, our proposed
framework was able to detect these Trojan (shown in Table I) by
utilizing the propagation depth analysis.
Also, [19] cannot detect Trojans, e.g., s35932-T100 which work
in scan mode in DfT inserted netlist due to taint explosion. However,
our technique can detect this Trojan (shown in Table II) because it
can work with DfT inserted netlist.
Jasper: A SoC designer without the white box knowledge of an
IP may not be able to utilize Jasper [18] tool to detect Trojan
such as AES-T2000 and AES-T2100 which rely on the dynamic
power consumption of internal registers to leak the key. However,
our Malicious Observe Point Identification technique can detect key
leakage to these malicious registers. This feature allows us to detect
them (shown in Table I).
PCC: Trojans like AES-T100 leak the key XORed with a PRNG
value through a malicious output port. In [16], the signal sensitivity
of the key downgrades due to the XOR operation and the malicious
output has a sensitivity value of { f ix : 0}. Meaning that this port
does not leak any sensitive information and the Trojan would bypass
the detection by [16]. Our framework was able to detect this Trojan
(shown in Table I).
VI. LIMITATIONS OF PROPOSED APPROACH
Our IFS verification framework relies on partial scan ATPG to
identify all observe/control points to detect Trojan. However, it
is possible that there exists observe/control points which are not
detected by ATPG. This can happen if ATPG gives up when it takes
too long to find patterns for asset propagation/activation. Also, as we
increase the sequential depth of partial scan ATPG, it also increases
the complexity to generate the required sequence of patterns. At
some sequential depth, ATPG may fail to generate patterns to detect
observe/control points. However, at such depth, an attacker would
have little to gain by controlling and observing the control and
observe points which were not found by the ATPG.
ATPG algorithm cannot work with latches and uncontrollable FFs
as ATPG cannot control these components. Therefore, if a Trojan
implementation contains latches or uncontrollable FFs, these ob-
serve/control points will not be detected by our proposed framework.
However, it is highly unlikely that latches and uncontrollable FFs
will be present in a properly implemented design. Moreover, our
framework will issue a warning and will report the names along with
the location of these components. We can then insert test points at
these locations and analyze them using our technique.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a framework which detects
violation of IFS policies caused by Trojans without the need of
white-box knowledge of the IP. We have experimentally validated
the effectiveness of our technique by detecting Trojan benchmarks
from the trust-hub. We also compare our technique with the state-
of-the-art Trojan detection techniques and validate that our proposed
technique does not share the limitations of these techniques. Our
proposed technique can identify IFS violation in a design. Here,
we focused how to utilize it to detect hardware Trojans. However,
this technique can also be used to detect IFS violations which are
unintentionally introduced by design mistakes or CAD tools.
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